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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
LEON STUCKI, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
JAMES ELLIS, W. H. STE-
WART, JUNE S. SPACMAN, 
CLARE SPACKMAN, 
THOMAS A. TARBET, and 
MAGNUS OLSEN 
Defendants, and Appellant 
THOMAS,A. TARBET. 
Respondent 
W. H. Stewart's 
Brief 
Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial 
District of the State of Utah, in and for the 
County of Cache . 
.... ... , ...- v Hon. Marriner M. Morrison, Judge 
I• 1 1 ...~ E D-----
• 301941 L. E. NELSON 
·-------------------- ----------.i\J:torney for Cross-Respondent, 
otERK, SUPR£11£ COURT, UTAH W. H. STEW ART. 
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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
LEON STUCKI, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
J~\~IES ELLIS, W. H. STE-
WART, JUNES. SPACMAN, 
CLARE SPACKMAN, 
THOi\IAS A. TARBET, and 
~LAGNUS OLSEN 
Defendants, and Appellant 
THO~\'IAS A. TARBET. 
Respondent 
'W~. H. Stewart's 
Brief 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The plaintiff and respondent has cross appealed a-
gainst the defendant W. H. Stewart, contending that the 
court erred in granting Stewart's motion for nonsuit and 
dismissal of plaintiff's action as to him. In resisting this 
cross appeal we desire to briefly state the facts as devel-
oped at the trial. 
The property involved in this action consists of a 
small home located at 459 West Center Street, Logan, 
Utah. The defendants, June Spackman and Clare Spack-
man, purchased this property on October 9, 1945; (Ex. 
I. Tr. 76) and sold the same to the defendant James C. 
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Ellis under written contract (Ex. A, Tr. 51) on October 
16, 1945, for the sum of $1,000.00, of which amount $400. 
00 was paid in cash, and the balance of $600.00 was pay-
able in monthly payments of $10.00 or more on the 1st 
day of each month beginning November 1st, 1945. (Tr. 
51 ) . The defendant Ellis then took possession of the 
property and resided therein continuously until the 26th 
day of February 1946, when he sold the same to the de-
fedant Tarbet (See Exhibits D. H & J. Tr; 52, 53, 54.) 
Sometime after Ellis took possession, a portion of 
the roof was destroyed by fire, (Tr. 160) and plaintiff 
was employed by Ellis during the month of December, 
1945, to repair the roof. (Tr. 105) The repairs were 
made between January 2nd, and 23rd, 1946. (Tr. 106, 
127). 
On February 18, 1946, defendant Ellis listed the prop-
erty for sale with the real estate firm of Stewart and Har-
rison, of which defendant, Stewart is a partner, (Ex. H. 
Tr. 53, 149) and the property was sold by this firm to 
the defendant Tarbet for $1500.00; the sale was closed 
on February 26th, 1946, from which sale Ellis received 
$800.00 in cash. (Ex. D, Tr. 52, 178, 179). 
A few days' prior to March 15, 1946, the plaintiff 
sent a statement of his account against Ellis for repair-
ing roof to defendant Stewart, which was mailed back to 
the plaintiff with the notation thereon that Stewart knew 
nothing about the account. ( Tr. 108, 169, 170) The 
first time plaintiff and his foreman Roy Earl talked with 
Stewart about this account was after Stewart returned the 
aforesaid statement to the plaintiff. 
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ARGUMENT 
It is submitted that the evidence when viewed as a 
"Thole will not sustain plaintiff's contention that he re-
lied solely upon Stewarfs alleged promise to pay for the 
repairs. In the first place, why should Stewart ptake 
such a promise? He had no interest in the property. El-
lis was in possession of the same under written contract, 
and had paid $400.00 on the purchase price. It is true 
that Stewart"s daughter, June Spackman, had an interest 
in the property, but she was protected under her contract 
of sale. So there is no reason why Stewart, should pay 
the repair bill. It is apparent that Ellis informed Stucki 
that there was insurance on the home, and that Stewart 
was the agent for the insurance company. And there is 
a strong inference from the evidence that the account was 
charged to Ellis alone, since one of the sales slips, was re-
ferred to as having been signed by Ellis. ( Tr. 121) If 
plaintiff had relied solely upon Stewart's promise to pay 
the bill and had charged the work and material against 
Stewart, why did he not bring the account into court? 
The burden of proof was (upon plaintiff to establish this 
fact. And moreover, if plaintiff relied solely upon Stew-
art, and not Ellis, then why is Ellis made a party defen-
dant, and why are the other defendants sued? 
It is rather singular that plaintiff would place all his 
reliance upon Stewart's promise to pay the bill, and then 
wait until about March 12th, 1946, a period of two months 
before he talked with Stewart. It is very evident that 
plaintiff sent the bill to Ellis on February 1st, 1946, and 
\vhen Ellis saw the size of the account, then he decided to 
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sell the place, collect his equity, and leave town. This 
inference is supported by the fact that Ellis listed the 
property for sale on February 18th. 
Plaintiff and his foreman Earl, attempted to show 
by their testimony that a statement was mailed to Stew-
art about February 15th, but that testimony is disputed 
by the uncontradicted evidence. The documentary evi-
dence, (Exhibits 1 and 2; Tr. 49, 50) and Exhibits D, H,. 
and J.; Tr. 52, 53 and 54) clearly refute the testimony 
of the plaintiff and Mr. Earl. For instance, if plaintiff 
and Earl had talked with Stewart about _February 12th 
as they testiifed, (Tr. 108,) Stewart and Harrison would 
not have paid Ellis $800.00, knowing that Stucki had an 
unpaid repair bill against Ellis of .over $300.00 And, 
plaintiff and Earl testified that after they talked to Stew-
art and he disowned the bill, they went to Ellis' home and 
found it vacant, and found that Tarbet was painting iL 
-( Tr. 111, 112). It is doubtful that Ellis and his family 
would vacate the property before they sold it, and certain-
ly Tarbet would not be painting the home before he 
bought it. The sale was not closed until February 26th, 
and the deed to Tarbet, (Ex. 2) was not executed and 
delivered until March 1, 1946. And plaintiff testified 
that as soon as he learned that Ellis had quit his job and 
had vacated his home which he claims that he learned 
about February 15th to the 17th, ( Tr. 113) he told Tar-
bet that he intended to file a mechanic's lien on the prop-
erty. If Tarbet had learned as early as February 17th,. 
that a lien was about to be filed against the property he 
intendend to purchase, would Tarbet not have insisted 
that this debt be paid out of Ellis's s~are of the purchase 
price? The lien was executed and filed on March 15, 
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1948, (Tr. 48) so this is further proof that it was about 
i\1arch 12th, and not February 12th, when plaintiff talked 
with Stewart and Tarbet. 
The foregoing definitely proves that plaintiff and 
Earl \vere mistaken about the tin1e they talked with Stew:.. 
art and Tarbet, and if they were mistaken about that, 
they could also be mistaken about their contention that 
defendant Stewart n1ade an original promise to pay this 
bill. Remember that more than two years elapsed be-
tween the occurrence of this transaction and the date of 
the trial. ( Tr. 103) And moreover, if Stewart had 
made that promise and became personally liable, it isn't 
likely that he would have settled with Ellis without proof 
that the bill was paid. The plaintiff testified that as soon 
as Stewart disowned the bill and plaintiff then found the 
home vacant, he immediately turned the matter over to 
his attorney and the notice of intention to claim a lien 
was filed. (Tr. 119) on March 15, 1946 . 
. ARGU1v1ENT AND AUTHORITIES 
The rule of law is well established that to hold a per-
son liable on an original promise such as plaintiff is con-
tending for in this case, the pl~adings and evidence must 
show that credit was given exclusively to the promisor. 
If credt is also extended to the person for whose benefit 
the promise is made, the promise is collateral and within 
the statute, 27 C. J. 142, Section 141; Wood on the Stat-
ute of Frauds, Page 98. A promise to pay for the goods 
delivered to another is collatral and within the statute 
of Frauds. Sherperd v. Clements (Ala. app.) 141 So .. 
245; Allen v. Smith and Braud, 133 So. 599; Waldock v. 
First National Bank (Okla.) 143 Pac. 53; Forster-Davis 
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Motor Corp. v. Abraus ( Okla) 53 P. ( 2d) 569. 
In 27 C. J. 142, the rule is stated thus: 
"But in all such cases it is requisittthat credit should 
be given exclusively to the promisor; if any credit is given 
to him for whose benefit the promise is made the prom-
ise is collateral and within the statute.;,' 
In Wood on the statute of Frauds, Page 98, the rule 
is stated: 
"In all such cases it is requisite that credit should be 
given exclusively to the promisor; if any credit be given 
to him for whose benefit the promise is made, the prom-
isor is not liable unless his promise is in writing, and this 
is so although the collateral undertaking may have been 
the principal inducement to the delivery of the goods." 
In the case of Waldock v. First National Bank, supra,. 
the Supreme Court of Oklahoma states the rule in the 
following language: 
t:t:Where money is loaned or goods sold to R. for his 
use and benefit, and credit is extended to R and W joint-
ly, or if credit is extended to R, W:1 s promise to pay is col-
lateral, and comes within the statute of Frauds, unless 
it is in writing.>> 
There is no evidence in the record that credit was 
extended exclusively to Stewart, and there is no evidence 
that the account was even charged against him. But, 
there is a strong inference from the evidence that the ac-
count was charged against Ellis alone. And plaintiff 
alleges in paragraph four of his complaint, (Tr. 2) that, 
-"Plaintiff :\'H'H~<was induced to repair the same by said 
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James Ellis and W. H. Stewart, under promise and agree-
nlent by them to pay the repair bill in full as soon as the 
\vork was completed.:J:J Thus the complaint alleges an in-
debtedness against Ellis, for whose property the repair 
was n1ade. Therefore, by joining Ellis with Stewart, the 
latter \vould be only a guarantor. 
Plaintiff has thus pleaded himself squarely within 
the statute. And from the evidence i/appears that plain-
tiff was not relying upon Stewart personally but upon in-
surance that was reported to be upon the property. (Tr. 
131). 
We submit that plaintiffs pleading and theory is 
precisely like that in the Montana case of Fortman vs. 
Leggerini, 152 Pac. 33, where the Court said: 
ccw e think it perfectly clear from the record that the 
whole course of the litigation up to the time the motion 
for nonsuit was made preceeded upon the theory of guar-
anty, and whether the plaintiff, after pleading and trying 
his case upon that theory, can now vindicate the judg-
ment as for an original obligation, is, to say the least, open 
to serious doubt.'' 
Thus from the pleadings and the evidence, according 
to the above cases and authorities, the trial court was 
within the law in granting Stewart's motion for non-suit 
and judgment of dismissal. 
II 
When the action is brought jointly against the person 
who received the merchandise as well as the alleged guar-
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antor, the courts hold that the promise is collateral and 
not original. In the Oregon case of Masters vs. Bidler 
et. al. 198 Pac. 912, the plaintiff sued both the person who 
received the merchandise as well as the alleged guarantor. 
The court held that the promise was not original but col-
lateral. 
~'If we now apply the test established by the law, the 
conclusion must be that the promise of Townley was a col-
lateral one. It will be recalled that, when asked ''On 
whose credit did you extend-did you deliver these goods?'> 
Perkins answered, "Well, on Mr. Tow1iley's principally, 
because we didn't know Mr. Bidler; only just what Mr. 
Townley had told us, is all." Thus it appears from the 
testimony of Perkins himself that credit was given to 
T otvnley "Principally"; and this is only another way of 
saying that credit was in part given to Bidler. More over, 
the plaintiffs subsequently treated Bidler as a debtor, and 
finally they sued Bidler, together with Townley, on the 
theory that Bidler was also liable, and they prosecuted 
that theory to a judgment against Bidler.'' (Underlined 
Supplied). 
And in the case of Atlas Coal Con1pany vs. Tomp-
kins, 158 Pac. 1106, the Supreme Court of Kansas said: 
"And there can be no claim that the plaintiff ceased 
to hold. Turner liable in the face of the fact that he was 
sued on the same claim sometime after the transactions 
in October." 
In the case of Forster-Davis Motor Corporation vs. 
Abraus, (Okla.) 53 P. ( 2d) 569, the alleged promisor and 
the third party were sued jointly on a debt, and the Su-
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pre1ne Court of Oklahoma referred to the plaintiffs' com-
plaint to show that the plaintiff relied upon the benefic-
iary as well as the alleged promisor for payment of the 
debt. 
111 
As we have heretofore shown, there are facts and 
circumstances in this case which prove that plaintiff did 
not rely upon Stewart to pay this obiigation. The Courts 
hold that the nature of the promise is usually to be deter-
mined by the trial court, or a jury, as a question of fact, 
and the finding of the trial court or jury is binding upon 
the Appellate Court. This is especially true where the 
question whether the promise was original or collateral 
and the language used is not clear or definite; and, where 
as here, the plaintiff did not charge the account against 
Stewart, and coupled with Stewart's denial that he prom-
ised to pay the obligation. Thus the evidence being un-
certain and in conflict, the court sitting as a trier of the 
facts had a right to \Veigh the evidence and consider all 
the conflicting facts and circumstances and its finding 
that the alleged promise of Stewart was not original but 
collateral, and thus within the statute, is binding upon 
this Court. 
This rule was adhered to by the Supreme Court of 
Oklahoma in the case of Kimbrel vs. Long ( Okla) 65 P. 
(2d) 475, where that Court held: 
(CThe Court having submitted the issue directly to the 
fury as to the primary liability of the defendants, and 
there being evidence to support the verdict of the fury, 
such veridct may not be disturbed by this court." 
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The same rule was laid down by the Supreme Court 
of Montana in the case of McGowan Commercial Com-
pany vs. l\1idland Coal & Lumber Company, 108 Pac. 
655. The Court said: 
"But whether Clark intended to bind himself or the 
defendant company was a question of fact for the jury to 
determine from all that was said and done and from all 
other surrounding facts and circumstances. Gerber v. 
Stuart, 1 Mont. 172; 1 Am. & Eng. Ency. Law (2d Ed.) 
1121; 31 Cyc. 1553; 2 Ency. L. & P., 920-923) ." 
The Supreme Court of Oregon in. the case of Mc-
Millian vs. Dickover 248 Pac. 154, cited by counsel on 
pages 18 and 19 of respondents brief, lays ?own the rule 
in the following language: 
.:.:Where the language used by the parties is ambigu-
ous and the intention is not clear, it is a question of fact 
for the jury as to whether a promise is original or collater-
al. Masters et. al. v. Bidler et. al., supra; Mackey v. Smith 
et. al, supra. As stated in 25 R.C .L. 490." 
.:.:Where the language used, together. with the sur-
rounding facts and circumstances, makes it doubtful 
whether the parties intended by the promise to create an 
original or a collateral obligation, the intention should be 
determined by the jury.'' 
We respectift~ly submit that in view of the facts and 
circumstances in the case at bar that the finding of the 
trial court is final, because giving the plaintiff's testimony 
the most favorable view it does not amount to a definite 
and direct promise on the part of Stewart to be originally 
obligated to pay this debt. 
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IV 
The plaintiff's theory in the trial court and in his brief 
seen1s to be that Stewart had an interest in the property 
and therefore he \Vould be anxious to have the repairs 
made. This contention is far fetched. In the first place, 
Stewart had no personal interest in the property. His 
daughter June owned an equity in the san1e but she was 
amply protected under her contract. 
On page 17 of plaintiff's brief, counsel says Stewart 
does not claim that his promise was a collateral obliga-
tion. Stewart expressly pleaded (Tr. 18) that the al-
leged promise was within the Statute of Frauds. 
Counsel repeatedly states in his brief that plaintiff 
relied upon Stewart's promise. But plaintiff's conduct 
and actions belie his words. If plaintiff was relying 
solely upon Stewart, then why did he not charge 
the account against Stewart. Why was this fact not 
proved at the trial? ·The record is silent upon this point. 
And moreover, if Stewart was responsible on an original 
promise, as contemplated by Section 33-5-6 ( 2), then 
why did plaintiff also join the other defendants and seek 
the foreclosure of a mechanics lien? This would strong-
ly indicate that plaintiff did not regard too highly his pur-
ported claim against Stewart. 
In conclusion defendant Stewart, respectfully sub-
mits: 
(a) There is no evidence in the record that he made 
an original promise to pay this debt. 
(b) That at most, his promise is collateral and with-
in the statute. 
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(c) That plaintiff was guilty of laches in bringing 
the unpaid condition of his debt against Ellis to the atten-
tion of one or more of the defendants herein named. 
(d) That the defendant Stewart and Tarbet acted 
with due care in checking upon any claims that may have 
affected this property by having the abstract of title (Ex. 
1, Tr. 81) certified to March 4, 1946. If plaintiff had filed 
his intention to claim a lien in due time, it would have ap-
peared in the abstract extension, and his debt would have 
been satisfied from Ellis' equity in the property. 
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully submitted that the 
finding and judgment in favor of W. H. Stewart, granting 
his motion for dismissal and non-suit be affirmed and 
that he recover his costs expended herein. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
L. E. NELSON 
Attorney for Cross-Respondent, 
W. H. Stewart 
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